Verifying Constant Time Implementations

Media Summary: USENIX Security '23 - ProSpeCT: Provably Secure Speculation for the Presented by David Pichardie. Presented at POPL'20. The runtimes of certain floating-point instructions can vary up to two orders of magnitude with instruction operands, allowing ...

Verifying Constant Time Implementations - Detailed Analysis & Overview

USENIX Security '23 - ProSpeCT: Provably Secure Speculation for the Presented by David Pichardie. Presented at POPL'20. The runtimes of certain floating-point instructions can vary up to two orders of magnitude with instruction operands, allowing ... Cache attacks are a class of side-channel attacks that have been used since 2005 to break

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Verifying Constant-Time Implementations

USENIX Security '16 - Verifying Constant-Time Implementations

USENIX Security '19 - IODINE: Verifying Constant-Time Execution of Hardware

USENIX Security '24 - GoFetch: Breaking Constant-Time Cryptographic Implementations Using Data...

USENIX Security '23 - ProSpeCT: Provably Secure Speculation for the Constant-Time Policy

Verifying and Synthesizing Constant-Resource Implementations with Types

Binsec/Rel: Efficient Constant-Time Analysis of Binary-Level Code with Relational Symbolic-Execution

Formal Verification of a Constant-Time Preserving C Compiler

[PriSC'26] Modular Verification of Probabilistic Constant-Time

Towards Verified, Constant-time Floating Point Operations

Thomas Pornin - Non-Crypto Constant-Time Coding

[PriSC'23] Robust Constant-Time Cryptography

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Verifying Constant-Time Implementations

Verifying Constant-Time Implementations

The

USENIX Security '16 - Verifying Constant-Time Implementations

USENIX Security '16 - Verifying Constant-Time Implementations

Verifying Constant

USENIX Security '19 - IODINE: Verifying Constant-Time Execution of Hardware

USENIX Security '19 - IODINE: Verifying Constant-Time Execution of Hardware

IODINE:

USENIX Security '24 - GoFetch: Breaking Constant-Time Cryptographic Implementations Using Data...

USENIX Security '24 - GoFetch: Breaking Constant-Time Cryptographic Implementations Using Data...

GoFetch: Breaking

USENIX Security '23 - ProSpeCT: Provably Secure Speculation for the Constant-Time Policy

USENIX Security '23 - ProSpeCT: Provably Secure Speculation for the Constant-Time Policy

USENIX Security '23 - ProSpeCT: Provably Secure Speculation for the

Verifying and Synthesizing Constant-Resource Implementations with Types

Verifying and Synthesizing Constant-Resource Implementations with Types

Verifying

Binsec/Rel: Efficient Constant-Time Analysis of Binary-Level Code with Relational Symbolic-Execution

Binsec/Rel: Efficient Constant-Time Analysis of Binary-Level Code with Relational Symbolic-Execution

5-Nov-19 Lesly-Ann Daniel Abstract:

Formal Verification of a Constant-Time Preserving C Compiler

Formal Verification of a Constant-Time Preserving C Compiler

Presented by David Pichardie. Presented at POPL'20.

[PriSC'26] Modular Verification of Probabilistic Constant-Time

[PriSC'26] Modular Verification of Probabilistic Constant-Time

Modular

Towards Verified, Constant-time Floating Point Operations

Towards Verified, Constant-time Floating Point Operations

The runtimes of certain floating-point instructions can vary up to two orders of magnitude with instruction operands, allowing ...

Thomas Pornin - Non-Crypto Constant-Time Coding

Thomas Pornin - Non-Crypto Constant-Time Coding

Cache attacks are a class of side-channel attacks that have been used since 2005 to break

[PriSC'23] Robust Constant-Time Cryptography

[PriSC'23] Robust Constant-Time Cryptography

[PriSC'23] Robust

USENIX Security '17 - Constant-Time Callees with Variable-Time Callers

USENIX Security '17 - Constant-Time Callees with Variable-Time Callers

... remote