Media Summary: Title: Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents Authors: Nikhil R. Devanur, Kira Goldner, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, ... Title: To Infinity and Beyond: Scaling Economic Theories via Logical Compactness Authors: Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Scott Duke ... Title: Pandora's Box Problem with Order Constraints Authors: Shant Boodaghians, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos, Stefano Leonardi ...
Ec 20 Flash Video Efficient - Detailed Analysis & Overview
Title: Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents Authors: Nikhil R. Devanur, Kira Goldner, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, ... Title: To Infinity and Beyond: Scaling Economic Theories via Logical Compactness Authors: Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Scott Duke ... Title: Pandora's Box Problem with Order Constraints Authors: Shant Boodaghians, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos, Stefano Leonardi ... Title: Designing Informative Rating Systems: Evidence from an Online Labor Market Authors: Nikhil Garg, Ramesh Johari Full ... Title: Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion Authors: Jerry Anunrojwong, ... Title: An Experiment on Network Density and Sequential Learning Authors: Krishna Dasaratha, Kevin He Full Presentation: ...
Title: More Revenue from Two Samples via Factor Revealing SDPs Authors: Constantinos Daskalakis, Manolis Zampetakis Full ... Title: Incentive Auction Design Alternatives: A Simulation Study Authors: Neil Newman, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Paul Milgrom, Ilya ... We aim to see if it's possible to design protocols that yield Paper presentation at the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (
