Media Summary: Computer Science/Discrete Mathematics Seminar II Topic: A unified duality-based approach to Mechanism Design in Bayesian Games: The Revelation Principle Yang Cai, McGill University Complexity and Simplicity in Economics
Bayesian Mechanism Design - Detailed Analysis & Overview
Computer Science/Discrete Mathematics Seminar II Topic: A unified duality-based approach to Mechanism Design in Bayesian Games: The Revelation Principle Yang Cai, McGill University Complexity and Simplicity in Economics payment, DSIC, reserve price, revenue maximization. Finish analysis of the shrinking auction (see Lecture 11 notes). Bayes-Nash equilibria and Matt Weinberg, Princeton University Optimization and ...
Nobel Prize winning economist Eric Maskin from Harvard University on privatization of the radio spectrum, history of the field, and ... Lecture 13.2: Information design -- example problem Mechanism Design Lectures: Bayesian Approximation Part 0: Introduction Eric Maskin Institute for Advanced Study May 12, 2008 More videos on